Docker applies a default seccomp profile that blocks around 40 to 50 syscalls. This meaningfully reduces the attack surface. But the key limitation is that seccomp is a filter on the same kernel. The syscalls you allow still enter the host kernel’s code paths. If there is a vulnerability in the write implementation, or in the network stack, or in any allowed syscall path, seccomp does not help.
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If you enable --privileged just to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nested process isolation, you have added one layer (nested process visibility) while removing several others (seccomp, all capability restrictions, device isolation). The net effect is arguably weaker isolation than a standard unprivileged container. This is a real trade-off that shows up in production. The ideal solutions are either to grant only the specific capability needed instead of all of them, or to use a different isolation approach entirely that does not require host-level privileges.
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